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We analyse security costs in one segment of nested purification protocol in a large quantum
cryptography network, employing the quantum switchers and repeaters. We demonstrate that
exponential or even super-exponential grow of entanglement resources occurs in dependence on
number of the network switchers. For this reason, an optimization in the nested strategy is suggested,
preventing a stronger than the exponential grow of entanglement resources.
PACS numbers: PACS number(s):00
Recently, quantum cryptography link using entangled
states [1, 2] has been experimentally realized [3], which
is basic step to futured quantum cryptographic network.
To construct this network, original Ekert’s protocol has
been extended by the quantum memories [4] and quan-
tum switchers [5]. Quantum memories carefully store the
entangled states before key distribution and the quan-
tum switchers are able to swap entanglement and con-
sequently, establish a secret communication between dis-
tant users. However, the entangled states transmitted be-
tween the users or stored in the quantum memories can-
not be precisely protected against undesirable decoher-
ence or the deliberate eavesdropper attacks. Due to these
influences, the entanglement exponentially vanishes with
increasing distance between the users. Fortunately, quan-
tum cryptography based on Ekert’s protocol presents a
potential advantage, since the users could regenerate the
secure key by implementing a purification protocol [6, 7].
Quantum purification is able to extract sufficiently en-
tangled pair of photons from a number of the pairs with
weak entanglement, utilizing only the local operations
and classical communications. Thus, the links between
users in the networks achieve a sufficient security and
the almost maximally entangled pairs can be stored in
the quantum memories for the next usages.
Practical implementation of the swapping/purification
idea based on the quantum repeaters in connection points
of network extended standard purification to nested pu-
rification protocol (NPP) [8, 9]. We can assume a link
consisting of total number N − 1 of the switchers con-
necting N pairs of imperfectly entangled states, having
non-unit fidelity with maximally entangled state. On the
first level, we implement the quantum repeaters in the
check points with L switchers between two repeaters. To
purify one pair with required amount of entanglement
between nearest repeaters, we need a certain number M
of copies that we construct in parallel fashion, as is de-
picted in Fig. 1. The total number of elementary pairs
is M(L + 1). On the second level, we repeat this pro-
cedure considering the outcomes of first level as input
pairs for second level. In summary, the total number of
elementary pairs will be [8]
R = N logL+1 M+1 (1)
which shows that the resources grow polynomially with
the distance N . However, the number of needed entan-
gled pairs M per segment and per one nesting level de-
pends on number of switchers L, on fidelity of pairs be-
tween the nearest users and required fidelity of outgoing
pairs between the distant users. To simplify discussion,
we require the same value of a long-distance fidelity as
the nearest users fidelity and denote it as “working” fi-
delity. It has been previously shown [8, 9] that for L = 2,
the optimal “working” fidelity F ≈ 0.95 requires mini-
mal number of four pairs per segment and nesting level.
However, if we want to create entanglement over arbi-
trary distance (large L), there is still a question, how
much weakly entangled pairs are needed between two re-
peaters for purification up to working fidelity. Shortly,
what is the relation M = M(L, F ) in the nested purifi-
cation protocol?
In this paper, we present an analysis of these security
costs, assuming an almost perfect entanglement between
the users in the neighbourhood. To distribute entangle-
ment between the distant users in cryptographic network,
an idealized swapping/purification protocol will be as-
sumed. These procedures can be implemented probabilis-
tically, with the help of only linear optics elements [11].
We demonstrate a new and important fact, that the num-
ber of imperfectly entangled states between two quantum
repeaters grows exponentially or even super-exponentially
with the number of implemented switchers. It is a cost
of exponential decoherence elimination, which must be
paid to achieve a secure key distribution. For this rea-
son, we suggest an optimized nested purification protocol
(ONPP), which prevents the super-exponential grow of
the security costs. It will be important for a construction
of the quantum cryptographic network, expected in the
next future.
Now we will theoretically discuss both the entangle-
ment swapping and distillation procedures in one seg-
ment of nested purification protocol, as is depicted in
Fig. 1. We assume that the nearest users (i, j = i + 1)
share two-qubit state
ρ(i,j) =
∑
k,l
B
(i,j)
k,l |Bk〉〈Bl| (2)
2which is given in the Bell basis
|B1,2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|B3,4〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (3)
Note that diagonal elements Bk,k = 〈Bk|ρ|Bk〉 are the
fidelities Bk with particular Bell states (3). First, we dis-
cuss a propagation of entanglement in the network utiliz-
ing the standard entanglement swapping [5] between two
links (i, i+1) and (i+1, i+2). Assuming Bell state anal-
yser, which, at least conditionally, distinguishes between
four Bell states (3), the diagonal elements Bk,k = Bk
change along rule
B
(i,i+2)
1 = B
(i,i+1)
1 B
(i+1,i+2)
1 +B
(i,i+1)
2 B
(i+1,i+2)
2 +B
(i,i+1)
3 B
(i+2,i+3)
3 +B
(i,i+1)
4 B
(i+1,i+2)
4 ,
B
(i,i+2)
2 = B
(i,i+1)
1 B
(i+1,i+2)
2 +B
(i,i+1)
2 B
(i+1,i+2)
1 +B
(i,i+1)
3 B
(i+1,i+2)
4 +B
(i,i+1)
4 B
(i+1,i+2)
3 ,
B
(i,i+2)
1 = B
(i,i+1)
1 B
(i+1,i+2)
3 +B
(i,i+1)
3 B
(i+1,i+2)
1 +B
(i,i+1)
2 B
(i+1,i+2)
4 +B
(i,i+1)
4 B
(i+1,i+2)
2 ,
B
(i,i+2)
1 = B
(i,i+1)
1 B
(i+1,i+2)
4 +B
(i,i+1)
4 B
(i+1,i+2)
1 +B
(i,i+1)
2 B
(i+1,i+2)
3 +B
(i,i+1)
3 B
(i+1,i+2)
2 , (4)
independently on the off-diagonal elements. If the swap-
ping procedure is carried out many times with an en-
semble of pairs distributed along the link, the iterative
rule (4) describes the evolution of fidelities in the link
with the switchers. However, the entanglement swap-
ping of weakly entangled states leads to generation of
lower entangled pair at a large distance. To improve
this long-distance entanglement, we can use LOCC pu-
rification procedure [7] requiring multiple copies of the
long-distance states. Deutsch’s purification allows us to
distill a state with needed amount of entanglement from
M imperfectly entangled pairs ρ(0,L+1) having fidelity
B1 > 1/2. It is composed from three steps: (i) the local
unitary operations on the sender side
|0〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉), |1〉 → 1√
2
(|1〉 − i|0〉), (5)
and on the receiver side
|0〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉), |1〉 → 1√
2
(|1〉+ i|0〉), (6)
followed by (ii) action of the quantum C-NOT operation
on the both sides
|a〉C |b〉T → |a〉C |a⊕ b〉T (7)
where C is control qubit and T is target qubit, and (iii)
measurement of the target qubits on the both sides. If
the measurement outcomes coincide, the control pair is
kept for next round. For two different states ρ(0,L+1) and
ρ′(0,L+1) described by fidelities Bi and B
′
i, the distilled
pair ρ¯(0,l+1) has the following shifted fidelities
B¯1 =
1
N
(B1B
′
1 +B
′
4B4), B¯2 =
1
N
(B1B
′
4 +B
′
4B1),
B¯3 =
1
N
(B2B
′
2 +B
′
3B3), B¯4 =
1
N
(B2B
′
3 +B
′
2B3),
(8)
where N = (B1 + B4)(B
′
1 + B
′
4) + (B2 + B3)(B
′
2 + B
′
3),
Bi, B
′
i are the fidelities of input pairs and B¯i are the fideli-
ties of an output distilled pair. Particularly, if B1 > 1/2
for all shared states, there is only one fixed point for
B1 = 1 [12]. After some steps of procedure, the out-
going state is sufficiently close to this fixed point (as it
is necessary) and the sender and receiver establish a re-
source for key distribution with a given security. After
m repetition of purification procedure, we can generate
a strongly entangled pair from 2m input lower entangled
pairs. In this way, an eavesdropping attack is factorized
from the sender-receiver state. On the other hand, if
the purification procedure does not converge, we cannot
use the outcoming pairs for the key distribution. Thus,
a convergence of the procedure must be simultaneously
proved in the communication. Note, when there are the
imperfect local operations, only a maximal non-unit fi-
delity is obtained, however as has been recently proved,
the users may nevertheless use these pairs for secure com-
munication [10].
The iterative procedures (4) and (8) represent a com-
plete solution of the presented problem for any two-qubit
states. To discuss the security costs in dependence on the
number of switchers, we will analyse two interesting cases
of the decoherence process. As first, we will analyse the
security costs in the network with the states ρ¯(i,i+1) after
an optimal individual eavesdropping attack - quantum
nondemolition (QND) measurement. We assume that
state |B1〉 is decohered by the standard QND monitoring
of basis states |0〉 and |1〉
|00〉|0〉E → |00〉|0〉E,
|11〉|0〉E → |11〉(R|0〉E +
√
1−R2|1〉E), (9)
where R is a measure of robustness against decoherence
and |0〉E and |1〉E are basis states of the environment. Af-
ter monitoring process and tracing out the environmental
3states, we obtain input states for swapping procedure
ρ(i,i+1) = B1|B1〉〈B1|+ (1−B1)|B2〉〈B2| (10)
where B1 =
1
2 (1 + R) is fidelity determined by the ro-
bustness. Note, that state (10) is entangled and nonlocal
for every R > 0. During swapping procedure (4), the
structure of state (10) is preserved and only the fidelity
B1 changes according to
B
(i,i+2)
1 = B
(i,i+1)
1 B
(i+1,i+2)
1 +
+(1−B(i,i+1)1 )(1−B(i+1,i+2)1 ). (11)
This rule can be iterated to obtain an outgoing state
from swapping procedure. Employing robustness param-
eter R, we can simply find that outgoing robustness is
R′ = RL, which is signature of pronounced exponential
decoherence. After swapping procedure (11), the result-
ing state is considered as the input of Deutsch’s purifica-
tion procedure for F = B1
F¯ =
FF ′
FF ′ + (1− F )(1 − F ′) (12)
which can be simplified for the same states utilizing the
robustness R¯ = 2R/(1 + R2). Introducing two new pa-
rameters r and r′, R = tanh r and R¯ = tanh r¯, we have
r¯ = 2mr = Mr, after m levels of the purification pro-
cedure. Due to this relation, we can express a relation
between near-users robustness R and the long-distance
robustness in form of R¯ = tanh(MarctanhRL) and ap-
proximately determine a lower bound on M as
M ≈ Int
(
ln(1 +R)− ln(1 −R)
ln(1 +RL)− ln(1 −RL)
)
+ 1. (13)
If R > 0, then purification procedure converges to fixed
point B¯1 = 1 for every L, however the number of
needed entangled states exponentially increases, as is de-
picted in Fig. 2 for almost maximal “working” fidelities
B1 = 0.9925, 0.985, 0.9625. This exponential overhead
is necessary cost that must be paid to establish a secu-
rity of quantum channel at a large distance. It is still
opened question, whether the LOCC purification proce-
dure can be modified in such a way to obtain only a
sub-exponential overhead.
As a second example, we consider Werner state be-
tween the nearest users. Note, that Werner state results
from the simplest eavesdropping strategy on the state
|B1〉: Eve steals the photon transmitted from sender sta-
tion with probability p and subsequently, sends another
photon with random polarization towards receiver sta-
tion. Particularly, for the L switchers with the L + 1
Werner states (having B2 = B3 = B4)
ρ(i,j) = p|B1〉〈B1|+ 1− p
4
1⊗ 1, (14)
where p = (4B1 − 1)/3, an outgoing state is the Werner
state (14) with p′ = pL. This is a signature a exponential
decrease of nonlocality and entanglement in a network
with large L, even if particular p approaches unity. Note,
that Werner state (14) is entangled if the entanglement
factor Λ = 1/2(1− 3p) is negative and does not admit a
local realistic explanation if the Bell factor Bmax = 2
√
2p
is larger than 2. After L swapping procedures, we obtain
a long distance Werner state with the following fidelity
B′1 =
3
4
(
4
3
B1 − 1
3
)L
+
1
4
. (15)
which is entangled if and only if B′1 >
1
2 . Then if is
possible to use the purification procedure, i.e. numer-
ically iterate the map (8). Number M = 2m (where
m is the number of purification steps) of pairs needed
to achieve the same fidelity, as has been between the
nearest users, is depicted in Fig. 3 in dependence on the
number L of the switchers for the “working” fidelities
B1 = 0.9925, 0.985, 0.9625. As can be seen, we have two
distinct regions of overhead: for given B1, the number
M firstly exponentially grows with L and this divergence
changes to rapid super-exponential behavior. Note, that
super-exponential overhead is pronounced as the fidelity
B1 approaches unity. For sufficiently large B1 > 0.95,
we can optimize NPP to prevent super-exponential over-
head, if we restrict the number L of switchers between
two repeaters
L <
1
2
(
1− ln(4B1−1)ln 3
) , (16)
to half of the maximal value Lmax, where Lmax is de-
picted in Fig. 2 by a cross symbol. In addition, it can
be numerically checked that the analysed case, employ-
ing the Werner states, is the most expensive from all the
cases with the same state (2) between the nearest users.
Because we are not able to priori know what are the
states distributed between nearest users, the restriction
(16) is a general way how to prevent super-exponential
overhead and it represents optimized nested purification
protocol (ONPP).
In summary, irrespective to very encouraging experi-
mental results in entangled state cryptography [3], en-
tanglement swapping procedure [5], a strong exponential
decoherence arises at a large distance from “multiplica-
tion” of small deviations from perfect near-users entan-
gled states. To avoid this decoherence, we can use the
nested purification procedure [8, 9]. In this paper, we
have found a general formula for the fidelity evolution in
this nested purification procedure and we have demon-
strated that, per nesting segment, this procedure exhibits
exponential or even super-exponential overhead in the en-
tanglement resources, in dependence on the number of
the entanglement switchers. We analysed the case with
a maximal overhead and optimized NPP by a restriction
of maximal number of switchers between two repeaters
to avoid super-exponential overhead. It is important for
any construction of the sufficiently secure large crypto-
graphic networks in the next future. However, there is
4a still opened question whether it is possible to obtain
a sub-exponential overhead by a modification of swap-
ping/purification procedure.
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FIG. 1: Segment of nested purification protocol: R- quan-
tum repeaters, S- switchers based on entanglement swapping
employed by particular users.
FIG. 2: Number of entangled pairs M = 2m needed for dis-
tillation of one entangled pair between distant users with
the same security as for the nearest users, L number of
the switchers in the link mutually sharing the same QND
states with given R: (a) R=0.985 (B1 = 0.9925), (b) R=0.97
(B1 = 0.9850), (c) R=0.925 (B1 = 0.9625).
FIG. 3: Number of entangled pairs M = 2m needed for dis-
tillation of one entangled pair between distant users with the
same security as for the nearest users, L number of the switch-
ers in the link muttually sharing the same Werner states with
given p: (a) p=0.99 (B1 = 0.9925), (b) p=0.98 (B1 = 0.9850),
(c) p=0.95 (B1 = 0.9625). The crosses denote a threshold
number Lmax of the switchers between two repeaters.
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